„The Croats have no right to a state“ – Serbian historiography, autobiographers, and publicists on Croatian state independence by Jakša Raguž
143
UDK: 930(497.11):321(497.5)
 Izvorni znanstveni članak
 Received: October 26, 2011
 Accepted: December 14, 2011.
“THe CROATS HAve NO RIGHTS TO A 
STATe” - SeRBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHeRS, AND PUBLICISTS ON 
CROATIAN STATe INDePeNDeNCe
Jakša RAGUŽ*
By analyzing a number of authors from the body of contemporary Serbian 
historiography, memoirs and current affairs writing, the author provides an 
insight into the standpoints on the establishment/renewal of Croatian state 
independence.
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The genocide in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II 
perpetrated against Serbs, Jews and Roma was the responsibility of all “who 
were at that moment Croats, their children, grandchildren and great-grandchil-
dren, all and forever, regardless of whether they were fascists or antifascists, 
and even regardless of whether their loved ones were killed together with the 
Serbs, Jews and Roma”. Anyone who believes that this is a quote from the 
work of some zealous Greater Serbian ideologue is mistaken. This is a citation 
from the book Otac (‘Father’) by Miljenko Jergović, a person who publicly 
declares himself a Croat.1 Why begin a text dealing with Serbian historiogra-
phy, memoirs and current affairs writing with a quote from a book written by 
a person considered a Croatian writer? In order to engender an understanding 
that these and other debased theories about the collective guilt of the Croa-
tian people which, among other things, preclude their right to their national 
freedom and state independence – which shall be portrayed herein - are not 
specific to the written word of a single (in this case Serbian) people, rather 
they are the product of a mental outlook which is odd to the say the least, and 
*  Jakša Raguž, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
1 Miljenko Jergović, Otac (Belgrade: Rende, 2010), p. 16.
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which may be found among individuals and smaller groups in all peoples of 
the world.
Serbian historiography, memoirs and current affairs writing on the estab-
lishment/renewal of Croatian state independence may be described as nega-
tivistic, i.e., the dominant position is that the Croatian nation had no right to 
the establishment of statehood in 1991. However, even within this stance there 
are three theories as to the extent to which the Croatian nation did not have 
this right, and why:
1. The first, provisionally called the most hard-core, is that the Croatian 
nation as such did not have the right to an independent state at all, 
and had to remain in the federal Yugoslavia or some other form of 
this Yugoslav state;
2. The second, somewhat softer but the most pervasive, is that the 
Croatian nation was entitled to depart from Yugoslavia and form a 
nation state, but that it should not have been established within the 
existing borders of the Republic of Croatia which, within this line of 
thought, also encompasses Serbian ethnic territories;
3. The third is that Croatia, as a federal unit of Yugoslavia, theoretically 
had the right to constitute itself as an independent state, albeit with 
two major caveats: first, its internal order could not be structured 
as a nation state of the Croatian people, but as a civic state; and 
second, this right to independence was restricted and even lost by 
the chauvinistic policies of the Croatian state authorities vis-à-vis its 
citizens of Serbian ethnicity.
Several of the most prominent examples of these three positions from the 
fields of historiography, memoirs and current affairs writing are presented, as 
well as the reasons specified as the grounds for these views.
An exemplar of the first, most hard-core group which negates the right 
of the Croatian nation to a state is historian Nikola Žutić from the Institute 
of Contemporary History in Belgrade and his book Rimokatolička crkva i 
hrvatstvo – od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije 1453-1941 (The Roman 
Catholic Church and Croatianism – From the Illyrian Idea to Greater Croatian 
Realization, 1453-1941), which was published by this Institute. In it, Žutić sets 
forth from the thesis that the Croats do not exist as a nation, rather they are 
the result of a vast, virtually worldwide conspiracy against the Orthodox Serbs. 
Žutić’s thesis is that in the early Middle Ages there was a small state of a Slavic 
people called Croats. However, both this state and that nation disappeared in 
the tidal wave of the Ottoman incursions in Europe, or more accurately, they 
remained “in traces” in some parts of today’s Croatia. During the early modern 
period, the Catholic Church attempted to convert the Orthodox Serbs, which 
succeeded only partially. Thus, together with pan-German, anti-Slav Austria, it 
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created a conspiracy, i.e., a far-reaching project which had at its core to impose 
upon the Catholic Serbs the name of that extinct nation – the Croats – and 
thereby shatter the unity of the Serbian national body. This conspiracy suc-
ceeded and the Croats emerged. But this was only the beginning of this con-
spiracy’s actualization. The next phase was to implement the Greater Croatian 
idea, i.e., the creation of a large Croatian Catholic nation state in the territories 
which the Catholic Church wanted to place under its domination. The expan-
sion  of the Croatian state also signified the expansion of the Catholic Church, 
i.e., this state became the tool, the means in the Catholic Church’s missionary 
activities aimed at the unyielding Orthodox Serbs. In order to fabricate certain 
rights in the implementation of this conspiratorial project, Croatian Catholic 
historiography was created, which employed unreliable and most often forged 
historical data and creative ideological constructs to formulate a historical 
myth, i.e., an entire quasi-history of a fictitious nation – and Žutić’s book is 
dedicated to exposing it.2
Thus, Žutić considers the Croats non-existent as a nation, an artificial na-
tion created by the Catholic Church and pan-German political circles, in order 
to serve their march toward the east, i.e., to establish the domination of the 
Catholic Church and the German nation over the Orthodox Slavs, primarily 
the Serbs. Thus the Croatian state, as the tool of this criminal conspiracy, is 
neither permissible nor possible, and the Serbian nation, if it wishes to pre-
serve its religious and national identity, had to and still must oppose it.
Another historian, Kosta Čavoški, also advocates the view that the Cro-
ats have no right to an independent nation state. Unlike Žutić, he does not 
delve into questions of ethnogenesis, rather he attempts to find support for 
his views in international and state law. In the foreword to the monograph Re-
publika Srpska Krajina (‘Republic of Serbian Krajina’ – a work by a large group 
of authors),3 Čavoški provides a chronological overview of the emergence of 
the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he claims that the reason for 
the Serbian rebellion and secession from Croatia is that Croatia forcefully and 
illegitimately, that is, “unconstitutionally withdrew from Yugoslavia and pro-
claimed its state independence”.4 Thereafter his text contains a rather extensive 
exposition in which he negates the right of the Croats and Croatia to self-
determination, including secession from Yugoslavia. His assertion rests in the 
declaration made by UN Secretary General U Tant in 1970 that the United 
Nations will not acknowledge the secession of a portion of any UN member 
state. Furthermore, he points out that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
2 Nikola Žutić, Rimokatolička crkva i hrvatstvo - od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije 
1453.-1941., Belgrade, 1997.
3 Kosta Čavoški, “Nastanak Republike Srpske Krajine i njen međunarodni položaj”, in: Repub-
lika Srpska Krajina (Knin – Belgrade: Srpsko kulturno društvo “Sava Mrkalj” – Topusko and 
Srpsko kulturno društvo “Zora” – Knin, 1996), pp. 11-24.
4 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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Republic of Yugoslavia from 1974 stipulates that the country’s borders can-
not be altered without consensus among all members of the federation, which 
Croatia allegedly violated with its unilateral and unconstitutional secession. 
Thirdly, he argues that Croatia had already consummated its right to self-de-
termination when it joined Yugoslavia, and that this right no longer exists. 
Therefore, Croatia’s referral to the right to self-determination when it with-
drew from Yugoslavia was neither valid nor justified, and this in turn prompt-
ed the Serbs to rebel against this abuse of valid legislation.5 Čavoški attempts to 
explain the fact that Croatia was nonetheless recognized by the international 
community by claiming it was an international diplomatic subterfuge. Accord-
ing to him, the world’s states feared a replay of the Yugoslav case within their 
own borders and the secession of individual provinces, so these events were 
not “presented as a consequence of unilateral and unconstitutional secession, 
rather as an ancillary outcome of Yugoslavia’s collapse, whose genuine reasons 
were not explained but rather concealed”.6
Something of a transition between the first and second position, i.e., be-
tween the first that the Croats have no right to a state and the second that they 
have this right within a limited territorial scope, can be found in the theories 
of historian Vasilije Krestić. In his book Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske (‘To 
Greater Croatia by Genocide’), Krestić explains why the Croats cannot cre-
ate their own nation state.7 The first reason, he says, is that the Croatian state 
and historical right is an ordinary falsehood.8 A second, much worse claim is 
actually aimed against the natural right of the Croatian nation to a state, which 
need not be linked to the historical right. Krestić’s thesis is that the Croats as 
a nation essentially are entitled to a state. However, for him the problem is 
that they opted for a nation state model that is not a classical state, but rather 
a criminal project, an “ogre-state”: for apparently the component calling for 
the extermination of the Serbs in the territories which must become a part of 
this state rests in its foundations, as an integral, inextricable part. According to 
Krestić, the creators of Croatian national consciousness systematically gener-
ated anti-Serbian hatred, keeping in mind that just the existence of the Serbian 
nation constituted the greatest hindrance to the achievement of the idea of a 
Croatian state. In this book, he devises a historical hypothesis whereby the 
Croats, from the revolutionary year 1848 to the very moment of the book’s 
publication, “intended to create a large, ethnically pure and Catholic Croatian 
state. Thus, the Serbs, not prepared to forsake their national distinctiveness 
and their Serbian Orthodox faith, were constantly in the crosshairs of Croa-
tian political parties and many very distinguished individuals who based the 
Croatian state idea on the so-called state and historical right… The idea of the 
5 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
6 Ibid., p. 14.
7 Vasilije Krestić, Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske (Jagodina, 2002).
8 Ibid., pp. 23-61.
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genocidal annihilation of the Serbs, of a large, ethnically-pure and Catholic 
Croatian state, has outlasted all statehood frameworks, and political and social 
systems. As a unifying thread, it runs from Ante Starčević, Eugen Kvaretnik, 
Mihovil Pavlinović, Josip Frank, Frano Supilo, Stjepan Radić and Ante Pavelić 
to Franjo Tuđman”.9 As a picturesque confirmation of Tuđman’s genocidal in-
tent, he cites the fabricated testimony of David Fisher, the president of the 
World Affairs Council of Northern California. According to this testimony, 
at a diplomatic corps conference in Germany in 1989, Tuđman declared “that 
when he becomes – and not if he becomes – president of Croatia, the ground 
in Krajina would become red with blood”.10
Therefore, Krestić concludes, the Croats could not create a state in 1991 
because it necessarily entailed the crime of genocide. In his book, he further 
asserts that unfortunately, despite everything, this ‘ogre-state’ was brought to 
life, and its character and stance toward the Serbs and overall political life truly 
confirms that it should not have been created, and that its very existence is a 
destabilizing factor in this part of Europe. Krestić states that upon the close of 
the war in Croatia in 1995, only the method of genocide was altered slightly, as 
it was – so he claims – perfected. “This policy is still, as it was a century earlier, 
comprehensively rooted in the ‘state and historical right’, on the institution of 
the Croatian ‘political’ (constitutive) nation, on the aspiration to create a large, 
ethnically and religiously (Catholic) pure Croatia. As long as this is the case, 
it should be known that Croatia will not be capable of freeing itself of geno-
cide, and that it will not back down from its long-held aspiration to expand 
its state borders at the expense of neighbouring ethnic and state territories, in 
order to improve its not very fortunate geopolitical position”. When reading 
Krestić, one gains the impression that the Republic of Croatia was conceived 
and organized as a gigantic concentration camp with the primary objective of 
exterminating the Serbs as a nation.
The most prominent proponent and advocate of the second position – that 
the Croatian nation had the right to leave Yugoslavia and form its nation state, 
but without those parts of the Republic of Croatia deemed Serbian ethnic ter-
ritory – is writer Dobrica Ćosić, a member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Science. Among the enormous body of works by this spiritual father of mod-
ern Serbian political thought, particularly notable are his decade-spanning 
memories called “Writer’s Notes”, a work which even today has cult status in 
Serbia, and which was recently put to film by Serbian national television. For 
this paper, I cite the notes written by Ćosić for the third volume, which pertain 
to the 1981-1991 period.11
9 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
10 Ibid., p. 91.
11 Dobrica Ćosić, Piščevi zapisi (1981-1991.), vol. III. (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2002).
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In them, Ćosić, contemplating political events in Croatia in 1990, the elec-
toral victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the ascendancy of 
Franjo Tuđman to the presidency and the ensuing changes, assessed that Cro-
atia was becoming a “chauvinist state” in which the “continuation of Pavelić’s 
policy of creating an ethnically cleansed state of Croatia” would be implement-
ed.12 To back his assessment, he cites Tuđman’s statement, which he character-
izes as an admission, made in March 1990, that “the NDH (Independent State 
of Croatia) was not an historical excess by the Croatian nation; Pavelić’s NDH 
was a historical continuation of the Croatian national ideology”.13 The politi-
cal changes which followed after the HDZ assumed power signified for Ćosić 
the establishment of “Tuđman’s Ustashoid state”,14 while he assessed the status 
relegated to the Serbs by Croatia’s “Christmas Constitution” (promulgated just 
before Christmas, 1990) as the same status they had “under Ante Pavelić dur-
ing Hitler’s time. The consequences of this Constitution will be disastrous for 
the Serbian people. They will now be compelled to use all necessary means to 
struggle for their national and civil rights or to flee from Croatia. And they 
may also be compelled to convert to Catholicism and become assimilated as 
Croats”.15 Therefore, “out of fear of legalized Ustasha ideology and anti-Serbi-
anism which has assumed a general and terrorist character…”16 and because 
“Croatia, with its new Constitution, has entirely deprived the Serbian people of 
their rights, provoking their bitter resistance”, the rebellion by Serbs in Croatia 
broke out.17 Ćosić commented on the Serbian rebellion thusly: “The Serbs in 
Croatia are once more fighting for Yugoslavia. And the Croats don’t want it. 
But the Serbs have no other state...”18 Thus, according to Ćosić, the situation of 
the Serbs in Croatia in 1990 was scarcely endurable. The impression is created 
that the Serbs in Croatia were in limbo, with mere days before the gates of Hell 
opened before them.
In early 1991, Ćosić asserted that Yugoslavia was breaking apart, and he 
made peace with the fact that the Croats and Slovenes no longer wish to live in 
it, which he saw as a legitimate right of these nations. Thus, in January 1991, 
he wrote: “Regardless of motive, the Serbs should not oppose the political will 
of the Croats and Slovenes to create their independent states, but within their 
ethnic territories”. He then demanded that Croatia’s borders be altered, such 
that the territories in Croatia which he deemed Serbian ethnic zones be at-
tached to Serbia.19 As to how this territory should be determined, Ćosić wrote 
12 Ibid., p. 145.
13 Ibid., p. 287.
14 Ibid., p. 294.
15 Ibid., pp. 298-299.
16 Ibid., p. 294.
17 Ibid., p. 349.
18 Ibid., p. 294.
19 Ibid., p. 303-305.
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that during the so-called “Barricade Revolution”, the Serbs “blocked roads to 
delineate the borders of their ethnic territory”.20 The view that the Croatian na-
tion can establish a state in its ethnic territory and the demand that Croatia’s 
borders be changed to Serbia’s benefit tied to insistence upon the biological en-
dangerment of the Serbs in Croatia henceforward became the “mantra” which 
Ćosić repeated in note after note.
Besides the aforementioned views in his notes up to the summer of 1991 
and the declaration of Croatia’s independence on 25 June, Ćosić also refined 
his thesis as to why the Serbs could not remain in the new states which were 
about to be created. Thus, he explained that the Serbian nation as a collective 
found it unacceptable to live outside of Yugoslavia, i.e., to live in any potential 
new states.21 In a note from April 1991, he even stated that the Serbs, with 
their right to create a state that would gather all of them in a single state, i.e., 
in Greater Serbia, would not threaten the rights of any other Yugoslav nation.22 
On the other hand, in a note from February 1991, he accused the Croats of 
“aspiring to create an ethnically pure Croatia and a ‘Greater Croatia’”, which in 
his view was the essence of primal evil.23
As for the Serbs in Croatia, Ćosić believed that their survival in an inde-
pendent Croatia state meant their national and civic disenfranchisement for, 
according to him, Croatia was a Nazi, chauvinistic, militarized party state cre-
ated by the HDZ under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman,24 who “is preparing 
Croatia’s armed secession, and the subjugation and expulsion of the Serbs”,25 
and Stjepan Mesić, then Croatia’s representative in the Yugoslav collective 
presidency, whom Ćosić described as a “primitive cynic and common Croa-
tian chauvinist”.26
According to Ćosić, in May 1991, when the referendum on Croatia’s inde-
pendence was held, “the Croatian-Serbian war began. This is not only a civil 
war, it is an international war provoked by the Croats”,27 for “a war for the 
borders of seceding states is beginning”. His assessments of the situation in 
Croatia were even more damning. He stated that Croatia’s primary objective, 
besides seceding from Yugoslavia, is to transform the local Serbian population 
into a national minority, into “a nationally disenfranchised Serbian nation, 
creating the right of the Ustasha to expel them as a ‘destabilizing factor’ from 
20 Ibid., p. 294.
21 Ibid., p. 303-363
22 Ibid., p. 320-321.
23 Ibid., p. 311.
24 Ibid., p. 342.
25 Ibid., p. 350.
26 Ibid., p. 348.
27 Ibid., p. 340.
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their centuries-long domains”, and even worse.28 He stated that “Tuđman’s 
Croatia, like Pavelić’s, will solve the Serbian question in Croatian fashion: ‘in a 
civilized way’ it will eliminate this ‘litter of mongrels’”, and he insisted that the 
Republic of Serbia will have to defend this part of the Serbian nation by force 
of arms and implement its “ethnic and territorial integration into the state”.29 
The imminent creation of the Croatian state for him signified the requirement 
that the Serbian nation “forsake its state; the state which it created through 
combat in the Balkan and World Wars. Those who secured their own nation 
states through the Serbian nation’s battles are now depriving the Serbs of their 
nation state”, or as he put it in his note of 17 May 1991, the creation of the Croa-
tian state is a “historic tragedy for the Serbian nation”.30 In his “Writer’s Notes” 
and in a series of other works, such as, for example, his texts in a series on the 
“Serbian question”, Dobrica Ćosić stood out as one of the leading opponents of 
Croatian state and national independence.31
Following Ćosić’s lead, one may find many other works dealing with the 
war. In the field of current affairs writing, there is the book Građanski rat u 
Hrvatskoj 1991. – 1995. (‘Civil War in Croatia, 1991-1995’) by Mihajlo Vučinić, 
the president of the Association of Serbs from Krajina and Croatia.32 Vučinić 
believes that the core of the problem lay not in the aspiration of the Croatian 
nation for an independent state, but rather in two associated components. The 
first is that the Croats wanted to create a state in territories that were ethnically 
Serb but were inside what he considers Croatia’s solely administrative borders. 
The other problematic component is the nature of this state, i.e., the manner in 
which Croatian leaders conceived and implemented its creation, and this was 
a large, ethnically pure state which would be achieved by means of genocide 
of non-Croats, particularly Serbs. With this goal, Croatian political leaders, 
among whom he cites Ante Stačević, the Radić brothers, Vlatko Maček, Ante 
Pavelić, Andrija Hebrang, Vladimir Bakarić, Savka Dapčević, Miko Tripalo, 
Ivica Račan, Franjo Tuđman and Stipe Mesić, accused the Serbs for all of the 
Croatian nation’s troubles, basing their policies on lies and deceptions, dissem-
inating hatred, and threatening the rights and existence of the Serbs in Croatia. 
For these two reasons, the Croats should not have been allowed to create their 
state within the 1990 borders of the Republic of Croatia.
Exemplars of the third position – that Croatia as a federal unit had the 
theoretical right to become constituted as a state in its existing borders only as an 
independent civic rather than nation state, but that this right was ‘squandered’ 
28 Ibid., p. 351.
29 Ibid., p. 354.
30 Ibid., p. 351.
31 Dobrica Ćosić, Srpsko pitanje I. (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2002), and Dobrica Ćosić, Srpsko 
pitanje II. (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2004).
32 Mihajlo M. Vučinić, Građanski rat u Hrvatskoj 1991. – 1995. (Belgrade: Udruženja Srba iz 
Krajine i Hrvatske i Srpsko kulturno društvo “Zora”, 2005).
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by the chauvinistic policies of the Croatian state authorities toward its Serbian 
citizens – are the fewest in number. One may cite military analyst Miroslav 
Hadžić as an example. In his book Jugoslovenska narodna agonija (‘Yugoslav 
People’s Agony’), he claims that the Croatian authorities had only themselves 
to blame for the Serb rebellion and the aggression of the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA). According to him, Tuđman’s stoked Croatian chauvinism and 
deepened Croatian frustrations over their permanent lack of a state, which 
provoked fear among the Serbs over “a repetition of tragic experiences with 
Croatian rule”, i.e., “a new genocide” and then armed rebellion as well.33 the 
Croatian authorities responded to this rebellion “with terror against the Serbs 
and an attack on their territory; Croatian forces made genocide, if not certain, 
then very likely”.34 They thereby forced the JNA to intervene in the war in 
Croatia for the primary purpose of safeguarding the Serbs. To confirm this 
thesis, Hadžić cited a statement by General Radovan Radinović from August 
1991, that “the secessionist aim of the Croatian authorities was not feasible 
without the complete pacification of the Serbian people in that republic, 
and pacification under these circumstances practically means the physical 
annihilation of the Serbs”.35 Readers of Hadžić’s text cannot discern whether 
the Croatian authorities truly intended to perpetrate genocide against the 
Serbs or if the peaceful formation of an independent Croatian state failed due 
to a series of erroneous and malicious moves by the Croatian authorities. In 
any case, Zagreb bore the blame for the outbreak of war.
Conclusion
Even though these few authors and their works presented herein may seem 
only a limited probing of the field of Serbian historiography, memoirs and cur-
rent affairs writing, many years of research on the Homeland War, which in-
cluded examination of the literature on this topic written by Serbian authors, 
has led me to conclude that intellectual circles in that milieu have a generally 
negativistic position on Croatian statehood. For most of them, the Croatian 
state emerged, if not on the basis of genocide and war crimes, then at the very 
least on the basis of injustice against and suffering of the Serbian people, and 
within borders and in territories which, if not Serbian, should have been grant-
ed the status of autonomous provinces. If they do not in fact accord collective 
guilt to the Croatian people for the war and the suffering of the Serbs, they at 
the very least ascribe a markedly negative role and character to the founders 
of the Croatian state. Therefore, one may conclude that Serbian historiogra-
phy, memoirs and current affairs writing, when dealing with Croatian national 
33 Miroslav Hadžić, Jugoslovenska narodna agonija (Belgrade: DANGRAF and Centar za civil-
no-vojne odnose, 2004), pp. 134-135.
34 Ibid., p. 136.
35 Ibid., 151. 
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and state independence, have not progressed much since the beginning of the 
1990s, when they served as a war-mongering means for the achievement of 
the Greater Serbian project. Taking into consideration the political and social 
climate in Serbia and the painful transformations which are under way or have 
yet to commence in that society, such assessments are not surprising.
“Die Kroaten haben kein Recht auf eigenen Staat” – serbische 
Historiographie, Memoirenliteratur und Publizistik über 
staatliche Unabhängigkeit Kroatiens
Zusammenfassung
Der Verfasser analysiert Werke mehrerer Autoren aus dem Korpus der zeit-
genössischen serbischen Historiographie, Memoirenliteratur und Publizistik, 
beschreibt ihre Standpunkte zur (Wieder)Herstellung der kroatischen staatli-
chen Unabhängigkeit und wie sie diesen Prozess darstellen. In den genannten 
Texten dominiert eine negative Sicht auf die im Jahre 1991 erreichte kroatische 
Unabhängigkeit und eine allgemein verbreitete Auffassung, dass die kroatische 
Nation kein Recht hatte, ihren selbständigen Staat zu bilden. Darin sind drei 
grundlegende Blickwinkel zu betrachten. Die erste Gruppe von Autoren negi-
ert sogar die Existenz der kroatischen Nation und vertritt die Meinung, die 
Kroaten seien eigentlich Serben-Katholiker und ihre Nation sei ein Resultat 
der Konspiration zwischen der Habsburger Monarchie und der Katholischen 
Kirche. Andere meinen, dass die Kroaten allerdings Recht haben, ihren na-
tionalen Staat zu bilden, jedoch die von Serben besiedelten Territorien auss-
chließend. Die Dritten hatten in theoretischer Hinsicht nichts dagegen gehabt, 
dass die Kroaten einen unabhängigen Staat bilden, aber keinen nationalen, 
sondern einen bürgerlichen Staat und all das hatte ihrer Meinung nach nur 
dann gegolten, bevor die kroatischen Behörden dieses Recht durch ihre chau-
vinistische Politik verwirrten.  
